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Abstract:
Human impacts on the Earth system have profound moral consequences. 
The uneven generation and distribution of harms, and the acceleration of 
human forces now altering how the Earth system functions, also trouble 
moral accounts of belonging. This article shows how moral geography 
can be renewed in this context. It begins by identifying how human 
impacts on the Earth system are shifting global norms of sustainability, 
such as in calls to enhance planetary stewardship and to transform social 
values. These shifts are important in themselves, but also reveal a 
deeper challenge to moral geography and the counterfactual heuristics 
traditionally relied upon to understand belonging. In response, many 
critical scholars have rethought the terms and conditions of belonging in 
the Anthropocene in reference to considerations of novelty, time, 
ontology, and agency. I argue that these strategies face difficulties that 
are not only analytical, but which also arise from new practices of 
belonging that accept critiques yet reach markedly different conclusions. 
I examine two cases of this kind. The first treats human forces as a 
geological sphere: the technosphere. The second incorporates the 
planetary boundaries framework of Earth system science as the basis for 
a grundnorm (a norm basic to all others) in international programs of 
environmental law and governance. Examining these two practices within 
the broader context of shifts in sustainability reveals a new politics of 
naturalization unperturbed by critical scholarship on the Anthropocene. 
By contrast, a renewed moral geography can identify how earlier norms 
of sustainable development, especially the promotion of economic 
instruments to secure environmental relief, now structure the 
incorporation of Earth system science in sustainability transitions. 
Retaining the structure of sustainability and accepting critiques of the 
Anthropocene are now giving rise to a new form of neoliberalism without 
nature. 
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The Moral Geography of the Earth system
1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter one, line one, of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987, p. 39) 
report, Our Common Future, reads: “The Earth is one but the world is not.” It was and remains a 
remarkable statement that consolidates global environmental challenges and naturalizes the 
normative trajectory of sustainable development: the convergence of multiple social worlds on a 
single Earth. This article examines how the norms of sustainability are shifting in the 
Anthropocene in ways that demand a renewal of moral geography. The shift is evident in global 
governance, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), when Earth system science is 
used as rationale to both constrain development within planetary boundaries and to compel social 
values, such as stewardship (e.g. Sachs, 2015; Steffen et al., 2015a). For instance, Steffen et al.’s 
(2018) landmark article showed how the planet could become “Hothouse Earth” if human 
impacts on the Earth system cross climate thresholds—a key planetary boundary—beyond which 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions would not prevent climate destabilization and lead to 
average temperatures higher than any of the past 1.2 million years. Steffen et al. (2018, p. 8254) 
then argued preventing climate destabilization and achieving the SDGs requires “deliberate and 
sustained” efforts to enhance stewardship across the biosphere, climate, and societies—a task 
that requires a transformation of social values. Beyond its stark warning, the argument of Steffen 
et al. (2018) shifts sustainability along three areas of concern to moral geography (cf. Smith, 
1997): First, it describes practices that have moral dimensions because they lead to harms or 
goods. In this case, actions leading to climate destabilization. Second, it makes normative claims 































































regarding what should be done: stewardship ought to be enhanced across the biosphere, climate, 
and societies. Third, it develops a metaethical argument regarding how to think differently about 
moral obligations in light of existing or expected conditions; an epoch in which humans alter the 
function and trajectory of the Earth system—the Anthropocene—requires transforming values 
(cf. Steffen et al., 2011, 2015b; Waters et al., 2016). 
Descriptive, normative, and metaethical arguments regarding the Anthropocene are not 
usually referenced to moral geography.1 As Section Two shows, part of this can be traced to how 
critical scholarship on the Anthropocene unsettles moral geography and the counterfactual 
heuristics that use ‘other’ spaces, places, or landscapes to challenge naturalized notions of 
belonging. A second reason, however, is that critical scholars often use the Anthropocene to 
recast notions of belonging in reference to considerations of novelty, time, ontology, and agency. 
This strategy has limits that are not only analytical. As Section Three shows, critical scholars 
often have targets to the side of practices already shifting norms of sustainability, and notions of 
belonging, in the Anthropocene. I examine two such cases: one treats humanity’s life support 
system as a geologic sphere—the technosphere—an idea circulating among Anthropocene 
Working Group members to assess the spatial and scalar burden of humans on the Earth system. 
The second uses planetary boundaries to establish a grundnorm (a norm basic to all others) in 
international environmental law and to provide a rational and empirical basis for the SDGs. 
In light of new practices of belonging that are unperturbed by critical scholarship on the 
Anthropocene, Section Four argues that a renewed moral geography must attend to a new 
politics of naturalization now taking shape. This form of naturalization does not presume that the 































































integration of ‘many worlds’ to one Earth is value-neutral; an idea long-rejected given that every 
view of the Earth is situated in a social world. Instead, this form of naturalization treats human-
Earth integration as empirical fact, not normative aim. It accepts critical rejections of nature as a 
non-social sphere. It agrees Anthropocene novelty generates a mismatch between human and 
geological time, and that non-human agency inflects the multi-causal account of human impacts 
on the Earth system. It is from these propositions, in fact, that the new politics of naturalization 
combines descriptive, normative, and metaethical claims into a moral geography of the Earth 
system. This new politics of naturalization, evident in the technosphere and an emerging 
grundnorm, raise concerns resonant with those over how ‘systems thinking’ frames social or 
biophysical integration (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2013). But the new politics of naturalization 
does more than frame integration. It begins with the proposition that integration has happened. 
This proves both impetus and catalyst for shifting sustainability from seeking integration through 
market instruments—so called ‘green neoliberalism’—to a form of neoliberalism without nature. 
A renewed moral geography must engage with the politics that structure how new practices of 
belonging naturalize, and further capitalize upon, Earth system processes.
2 ANTHROPOCENE CHALLENGES TO MORAL GEOGRAPHY
At the turn of the millennium, Schellnhuber (1999) argued a 2nd Copernican revolution was 
underway. It was a revolution unlike the first. Its aim was not to put Earth, and humans upon it, 
in correct astrophysical context, but to evoke a cognitive shift that “…will enable us to look back 
on our planet to perceive one single, complex, dissipative, dynamic entity, far from 
thermodynamic equilibrium—the ‘Earth System’” (Schellnhuber, 1999, p. C20). Echoing 































































Schellnhuber’s argument that the idea of the Earth system also required recasting sustainable 
development, Crutzen and Stoermer’s (2000) call to recognize the Anthropocene came with an 
argument to enhance environmental management and engineering for sustainability. For critical 
scholars, however, interpreting Earth system science as a new ‘Copernican revolution’ tacitly 
repositioned moral possibilities between poles of enhanced control (e.g. geoengineering) versus 
reflexive humility in view of a system too complex to control (Lövbrand et al., 2010). Castree 
(2016) amplified the stakes of this shift by arguing that global change research is itself value-
based. The timbre of such critiques is that one must not conflate what is with what ought to be. 
That is, the geologic forces wielded by humans do not naturally set moral options on an axis 
between enhanced control and humble retreat.
Revolution or not, the Anthropocene challenges moral geography, particularly the idea 
that “certain people, things and practices belong in certain spaces, places and landscapes and not 
in others” (Cresswell, 2005, p. 128). Typically, these ‘other’ spaces, places, and landscapes are 
important to how moral geography examines differences regarding the production, maintenance, 
and contests over belonging(s) (Sack, 1997; Proctor, 1998; Smith, 2000a,b, 2001). Prima facie, 
the Anthropocene appears to close off appeals to ‘other’ spaces, places, or landscapes owing to 
how all forms of belonging are now subject to an Earth system functionally altered through 
social actions. This challenge is not over how the environment is or has been used to naturalize 
intersecting issues of race, gender, or class (Livingstone, 1991; Harvey, 1996; Merchant, 2004). 
Nor, finally, is it about the orientation of moral geography to western philosophy, which has 
been criticized for the Eurocentric assumption that ‘other’ forms of belonging can or should be 
fairly made legible to western ethics (Preston, 2003, 2009; Tuck and Mackenzie, 2015). Those 































































concerns remain, as do those regarding the elevation of idealized accounts of injustice over 
spatially explicit accounts (Barnett 2018). Added to these is a methodological concern over the 
loss of counterfactual heuristics that use ‘other’ spaces, places, and landscapes to hold open 
possibilities for different forms of belonging. Counterfactual reasoning orients difference among 
possible forms of belonging to what has not happened or is not necessarily the case—to ‘other’ 
spaces, places, or landscapes. Counterfactuals are used, for instance, to reject environmental 
determinism (using the environment to explain social difference) through appeals to ‘other’ 
forms of belonging in similar environments or similar forms of belonging in ‘other’ 
environments. The Anthropocene, however, appears to create conditions where the social 
alteration of how the Earth system functions overdetermines ‘other’ forms of belonging to space, 
place, or landscapes. 
These concerns underwrite two related challenges. First, authors within and beyond 
geography argue that Eurocentric notions of ‘nature’ must be rejected. The quantitative evidence 
of human impacts on the Earth system compound qualitative arguments that reject the separation 
of ‘nature’ from human action (Clark, 2012; Yusoff, 2013; Lorimer, 2015; Moore, 2015; Purdy, 
2015). The upshot is that accounts premised on nature as a non-social ground upon which ‘other’ 
forms of belonging take shape require renovation to incorporate the actions, forces, and 
processes of humans and non-humans (Bennet, 2010; Johnson et al., 2014; Adams, 2016; 
Lorimer, 2017). Second, accounts of ‘anthropogenic’ forcing on the Earth system that employ 
universal notions of the ‘human’ (qua species) are rejected (Malm and Hornborg, 2014; Castree 
et al., 2014). Here, the ‘other’ histories, agencies, and worlds mobilized to challenge the largely 
capitalist pathways structuring human impacts on the Earth system are not consigned to 































































reproduce Orientalism (cf. Said, 1978). Rather, differences among human or non-human ‘others’ 
premised on fixed or transcendental categories are rejected for immanent explanations of social 
and geological phenomena coproduced across different life worlds (Tsing, 2015; Haraway, 2016; 
Danowski and Castro, 2017; Weston, 2017). 
Tandem rejections of nature and naturalized ‘others’ are not blind to uneven geographies 
nor to their study. Ghosh (2016) argues the counterfactual contrast of a stable Holocene versus 
an unstable Anthropocene betrays bourgeois ideals of stability that those forced to hazardous 
environmental margins have never enjoyed. Feminist scholars confront intersecting forms 
oppression in the Anthropocene based in race, gender, class, and colonialism to articulate new 
possibilities for solidarity, care, and belonging within and beyond human communities (Gibson-
Graham, 2011; Tolia-Kelly, 2016; Grusin, 2017; Hird, 2017). These insights challenge the easy 
affiliation of attachment to place—belonging—with moral consideration by pointing out that 
detachment also matters morally (Ginn, 2014). Moral considerations may extend, as Hale (2016) 
put it, even to the wicked parts of the wild. The methodological implications prompt Lorimer and 
Driessen (2014) to rethink inquiry in the Anthropocene as ‘wild experiments’ that cannot be 
configured through fixed or transcendent categories that demarcate ‘other’ landscapes. Likewise, 
Matless (2017) argues new vocabularies are now needed to articulate belonging, landscapes, and 
time in the Anthropocene. Below, I consider four overlapping themes frequently used to rethink 
the terms and conditions of belonging after the rejection of nature and naturalized ‘others.’ The 
goal is not complete coverage but to consider how the limits of novelty, time, ontology, and 
agency operate across descriptive, normative, and metaethical concerns in ways that demand a 
renewed moral geography.































































(1) Novelty. Echoing claims of a ‘2nd Copernican revolution,’ numerous scholars claim the 
Anthropocene is novel—a new Earth of human making (Hamilton and Grinevald, 2015; 
Nicholson and Jinnah, 2016; Parr, 2018). Novelty is often both descriptive and normative, such 
as when the ‘no analogue’ state of the Earth system provides rationale to claim a ‘no analogue’ 
state for normative reasoning about what ought to be done (cf. Steffen et al., 2004). For instance, 
Hamilton et al. (2015, p. 5, 8) argue the Anthropocene renders previous moral frameworks 
inadequate because there has been “no biological adaption and no cultural learning” sufficient to 
guide action under such novel conditions; as they put it, “Talk of ethics renders banal a transition 
that belongs to deep time, one that is literally Earth-shattering.” This categorical rejection has 
been critiqued for dismissing all cultural learning, especially non-Western knowledge and norms, 
by fiat (Schmidt et al., 2016). There is another facet, however, to how Hamilton links novelty to 
morality. The link is not metaphorical; it is unlike arguments that use geology to reimagine 
morality in ways philosophically unfamiliar to geologists (e.g. Yusoff, 2017).2 Rather, Hamilton 
claims Earth system science provides for moral experiences previously unavailable in human 
history. 
Rejecting Holocene morality, Hamilton (2017, p. 49, original emphasis) argues that only 
a new anthropocentrism will allow humans to take “responsibility” for their geological actions as 
“the central agent in a new kind of Earth.” Claiming earlier forms of anthropocentrism were “not 
anthropocentric enough,” Hamilton (2017, p. 53) argues the empirical descriptions of Earth 
system science require reimagining belonging to a transformed planet. He distinguishes his 
position from those who critique the Anthropocene without attending to how it is only through 































































Earth system science that knowledge of human impacts on the Earth system is possible. Principal 
among Hamilton’s (2017, p. 92) targets is Haraway (2016), whose notions of the Chtulucene, 
Capitalocene, or Plantationocene are dismissed as “terminological incontinence.”3 Haraway is 
not Hamilton’s only target, but a foil for those he claims compromise on the full implications of 
Earth system science. By contrast, Hamilton (2017: p. 91, original emphasis) holds that humans 
must embrace “the blunt truth of the Anthropocene…in the book of life, man is the greatest story 
ever told.” 
Hamilton’s account faces challenges. First, Hamilton contradicts his rejection of 
Holocene norms by reviving anthropocentrism. Apparently, some Holocene morals are worth 
keeping, yet Hamilton supplies no satisfactory argument explaining which ones or why. Second, 
Hamilton’s (2017) call for more anthropocentrism is structurally analogous to the ‘compromise 
of liberal environmentalism’ of sustainable development in the 1990s. At that time, economics 
gained legitimacy on the premise that markets would efficiently provide environmental relief and 
development opportunities, even though economic growth was widely critiqued as generating 
environmental harms (Bernstein, 2001). Hamilton’s (2017) compromise equivocates a key driver 
of ecological malaise, anthropocentrism, with neoliberal terms of responsibility that are the 
outcome of ‘blunt truth’ as he puts it (cf. Brown, 2015). Third, Hamilton’s (2017) 
anthropocentrism is all too ethnocentric. He offers no substantive engagement with notions of 
relationship, reciprocity, or obligation in other socio-cultural practices. Finally, as Sideris (2017) 
argues, eliding scientific and moral novelty ignores the importance of experience and place in 
everyday life. Global accounts of the type Hamilton offers often reveal more about the re-
enchantment of science-as-narrative than they do about changing conditions for new forms of 































































belonging. Nevertheless, Hamilton’s use of novelty upends counterfactual heuristics that imagine 
a place ‘outside’ the Earth system in the new time of the Anthropocene. 
(2) Time. The historian Martin Rudwick (2007) offered a penetrating assessment of how geology 
‘burst the limits of time’ by extending history to scales beyond human existence. For 
Chakrabarty (2009), however, the Anthropocene raises new questions of time because it requires 
linking temporal scales of geology, planetary science, and human history. Attempts to bridge 
different temporal scales produces rifts, Chakrabarty (2014, 2017) argues, owing to the 
incommensurable times used in accounts of geology and human history required to explain 
human impacts on the Earth system. The consequence, for Chakrabarty (2018, p. 8), is that the 
Anthropocene is never “completely separated from moral concerns.” Rather, the new “geology 
of morals” requires that belonging be configured amid incommensurate temporal scales 
(Chakrabarty, 2016). In one sense, ‘rifts’ over different notions of lived versus scientific time 
between the social and natural sciences are not new, as the famous showdown between Bergson 
and Einstein made clear a century ago (Canales, 2015). What occupies Chakrabarty (2017, 
2018), however, is not what approach to time is superior but how to navigate different notions of 
time once human actions puncture the Holocene and, with it, the possibility of parsing human 
from non-human time. 
Chakrabarty’s assertion of temporal rifts in Anthropocene time is not easy to defend. 
Coen (2016, p. 308) claims accepting incommensurability leaves us “paralyzed in the face of 
ethical questions that cannot be put off” and also doesn’t account for the contingent, social 
aspects of spatial and temporal imaginations, which imply that there is no “fixed meaning to the 































































‘human scale’ that could be set in opposition to ‘the planetary’.” In addition, Chakrabarty does 
not examine the configuration of time within Earth system science itself. It was the work of Ilya 
Prigogine on non-equilibrium systems that, to recall Schellnhuber (1999, p. C20), allowed the 
Earth system to be understood as a “single, complex, dissipative, dynamic entity, far from 
thermodynamic equilibrium.” Moreover, time was foundational to Prigogine’s work. For his 
account of time, he did not look only to physics but to the works of Bergson and Whitehead, 
among others (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Prigogine, 1997). In short, Prigogine entrained time 
into the physics of Earth system science in ways sophisticated and challenging, but not 
incommensurate with respect to human accounts of time. None of this implies Chakrabarty is 
wrong to identify challenges of time in the Anthropocene. It reveals, however, that moral 
geography must be attentive to how notions of belonging are often entangled with judgments 
about temporal categories—ontologies—across human and physical sciences.
(3) Ontology. Central to many appraisals of the Anthropocene is the rejection of fixed or 
transcendental categories of being and relations. A common aim is to exorcise dualisms between 
society and nature and to dethrone human exceptionalism (Braun and Whatmore, 2010). Once on 
flat ontological footing with other beings, forces, and processes, the agency of humans and non-
humans provide scope for new, immanent forms of belonging (Coole and Frost, 2010; Tsing et 
al., 2017). Before considering these, one exemplar of why ontology matters morally can by 
highlighted in uptake of object-oriented ontology (OOO) in geography. OOO is a realist view 
that takes Kantian gap between things and their phenomenal appearance to human subjects and 
generalizes it to all objects (Harman, 2013). Morton (2013) employs OOO to argue that the 
Anthropocene is marked by hyperobjects, like plastics and climate change, that are so vastly 































































distributed in space and time that they are incommensurate with the subject-object correlation 
through which phenomena are experienced. Hyperobjects are real entities that cannot be known 
directly, a trait they share with all objects in OOO, the truths about which are allusive and only 
indirectly known (Harman, 2013). Morton (2010, p. 127; 2017) argues that, as a consequence of 
thinking without nature and without the Kantian subject, morality must be oriented to 
“collectivity, not community.” 
Mitchell (2015) applies OOO to locate the Anthropocene mismatch between moral act 
and moral responsibility in a hyperobject: plastic. Plastics, on Mitchell’s account, are geological 
markers of human impacts on the planet that transgress liberal, cosmopolitan norms that imagine 
the moral community as a ‘circle’ that delineates those within as deserving of moral 
consideration and what is outside as morally relevant only with respect to those within it. 
Plastics, for Mitchell (2015), outpace liberal cosmopolitanism because they create relations and 
harms of such scope and duration that there is no place ‘outside’ the moral circle; no 
counterfactual ‘nature’ is available for circumscribing the moral community. Once plastics are 
distributed throughout terrestrial and marine ecosystems, and insinuated into the bodies of 
multiple species, the limits of modernity’s encircled moral geography are exposed. As a 
hyperobject, the harms of plastic undermine the imagined moral geography of liberal, 
cosmopolitan ethics and trespass its presumed boundaries of moral consideration. The upshot is 
that the new ontological class of harms created by plastics requires an alternate account of moral 
obligations.































































Mitchell (2015) makes several undefended moves, some of which are tied to deeper 
problems with OOO. First, if hyperobjects exist and are morally relevant then we are owed an 
account of the moral truths entailed by them. Yet, as with other truths in OOO, these would be 
allusive and indirect. Such truths provide little guidance for action.4 Second, OOO’s claim of 
incommensurability between objects and experience is suspect. Rejecting the Kantian subject 
does not warrant claims about humanity writ large. Many Indigenous communities have notions 
of subjectivity with (more than) sufficient resources to situate two and half centuries of 
anthropogenic climate change—a reputed hyperobject—in their moral communities (Watt-
Cloutier, 2015; Whyte, 2017). So do western societies. If the goods plastic provides can be 
situated in our experiences, such as in packaging for emergency food, water, or medicine, then 
why not harms? As Masco (2015) shows, nuclear fallout is already socially placed in the moral 
imagination of the United States. So, even though nuclear fallout meets the criteria of a 
hyperobject (Masco doesn’t treat it this way), it is not the ‘thing’ that renders it incommensurable 
but an ontological commitment that may or may not reflect social or cultural practices, 
imaginations, or categories.
(4) Agency. Where is agency in the Anthropocene? Slugs, plastics, and hydrological processes 
are just a few non-human agents in the work of critical scholars that reference Latour’s (1993) 
arguments that ‘things’ act in ways that refuse the society/nature binary.5 Latour himself, 
however, rejects critical scholarship. Instead of establishing critical distance by showing how 
‘matters of fact’ depend on actions of both humans and non-humans, Latour (2004) pursues 
empiricism to get ‘closer’ to how scientific facts and the things that affect them together produce 
matters of concern. For Latour (2017), this entails that morality cannot be projected against 































































‘nature’ in the Anthropocene but must reckon with how agency is distributed by multiple human 
and non-human actants. Here, Latour (2017) mobilizes Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis of Earth as a 
self-organizing system. Far from a stable site to reconvene ‘nature’ under even a provisional 
holism, Latour’s Gaia emerges much as Stengers (2017) also envisions: a cacophony of agents, 
forces, and processes that have only misaligned, if any, ends. With this notion of Gaia in hand, 
Latour (2014, 2017) contrasts his much-maligned ‘moderns’ with those he calls earthbound. To 
be earthbound, Latour argues, is to reckon the distributed agency of Gaia. The 
modern/earthbound contrast provides the basis of, and a foil for, a new moral geography. 
Following Sloterdijk (2014), Latour argues that earthbound individuals do not (as do moderns) 
seek immunity from nature on the ‘other’ side of the society/nature binary. Instead, the 
earthbound face Gaia’s gifts, uncertainties, and dangers. Latour then appeals to Schmitt’s (2007) 
distinction between friends and enemies as the normative basis for politics to argue that because 
‘moderns’ constituted themselves without respect to Gaia there has never been an ecological 
politics. Now, however, ‘moderns’ are confronted by ‘earthbound’ enemies who reject consensus 
on the society/nature binary and demand land and territory for themselves (Latour, 2015)—an 
earthbound moral geography.
Latour’s (2017) claim that ‘moderns’ had non-ecological politics ignores violent 
geographies of modernity. The proposed Anthropocene start date of 1610—marked by the 
“Orbis spike” of carbon sequestration that attended biomass regrowth in the Americas after 
millions of Indigenous peoples were killed through diseases and warfare—is just one piece of 
evidence (Lewis and Maslin 2018). As Davis and Todd (2017) argue, a defensible ethical 
position in the Anthropocene must confront colonial violence against Indigenous peoples. So, 































































when Latour (2017, p. 13) claims “there is no cure for the condition of belonging to the world” 
that may be true. But an account of belonging cannot ignore the modern, often violent 
coproduction of territory and ecology itself (Anker, 2001) or the genealogies of colonial thought 
that anticipate the Anthropocene (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016). Even if we accept Latour’s 
peculiar Gaia for the sake of argument, an evolutionary account would still distribute agency 
more widely across socio-cultural practices than what some moderns ‘discover’ as the basis for 
being earthbound (see Kohn, 2013). There are sympathetic engagements with Latour that seek to 
bridge between the worlds of the moderns and ‘others’ (e.g. Cadena, 2015). Nevertheless, the 
onus remains on Latour to give an account that reckons not only with Gaia, but also with the 
moral violence that his newly christened ‘earthbound’ agents are premised upon.
There are more lines of inquiry into belonging in the Anthropocene than those of novelty, 
time, ontology, and agency. Malm (2017), for instance, rejects many of the positions advanced 
above for a Marxist realism that retains the society/nature binary. What Malm’s polemic shares 
with others, however, is an analytical target to the side of practices already taking shape without 
nature or naturalized ‘others.’ The forms of belonging considered below accept the need to 
grapple with novelty, temporality, ontology, and multiple human and non-human forces. In short, 
they accept many of the points critical scholars of the Anthropocene make and are using them to 
shift practices and norms of belonging in global sustainability. 
3 THE TECHNOSPHERE, GRUNDNORM, AND GOALS































































Earth system science is already being used to shift norms of sustainability and to shape new 
forms of belonging in the Anthropocene. This section examines two such cases. The first is the 
treatment of humanity’s life support apparatus as a technosphere; a geologic sphere like any 
other (i.e. the hydrosphere, atmosphere, lithosphere, or biosphere). The second is the return of 
Kantian ethics via a grundnorm that uses planetary boundaries for the Earth system to ground 
international law and notions of ‘governing through goals.’ Whereas critical scholars counter 
forms of naturalization with new lines of inquiry, new practices of belonging in the 
Anthropocene suggest a new politics of naturalization that leverages the end of ‘nature’ into new 
descriptions, norms, and ways of thinking; into a moral geography of the Earth system.  
3.1 The Technosphere
Hannah Arendt (1958) once remarked that, from the perspective of the universe, automobiles 
might look like a biological mutation in which humans develop steel shells. Echoing attempts to 
take this Archimedean view, Earth system scientists, including members of the Anthropocene 
Working Group such as Peter Haff (2014, p. 302), have treated the technological apparatus that 
supports human life as a technosphere in order to gain a more “detached view of an emerging 
geological process that has entrained humans as essential components that support its dynamics.” 
According to Haff (2014, p. 302), the technosphere enables one to “adopt a non-anthropocentric 
view that technology is a global phenomenon that follows its own dynamics, representing 
something truly new in the world – the opening phase of a new paradigm of Earth history. In this 
sense, one might say that technology is the next biology.” 































































The technosphere should not be placed on a spectrum between the eco-modernist embrace of 
technology (Schellenberger and Nordhaus, 2011), the reputed ‘good Anthropocene’ (Dalby, 
2016), or appeals to abandon technological mastery for an ‘ecozoic’ view of mutually enhancing 
human-Earth relationships (Berry, 1999). Rather, the technosphere is premised on treating 
humanity’s technological apparatus geologically. Haff (2014, p. 301) provides a definition worth 
quoting at length: 
“The proliferation of technology across the globe defines the technosphere – the set of 
large-scale networked technologies that underlie and make possible rapid extraction from 
the Earth of large quantities of free energy and subsequent power generation, long-
distance, nearly instantaneous communication, rapid long-distance energy and mass 
transport, the existence and operation of modern governmental and other bureaucracies, 
high-intensity industrial and manufacturing operations including regional, continental and 
global distribution of food and other goods, and a myriad additional ‘artificial’ or ‘non-
natural’ processes without which modern civilization and its present 7x109 human 
constituents could not exist.”
For Haff (2014), humans are to the technosphere what water is to the hydrosphere—part 
of a physical system. Along with other members of Anthropocene Working Group, Haff 
contributed to special issues of the journal The Anthropocene Review that mapped the spatial 
area and physical extent of the technosphere. According to the calculations of Zalasiewicz et al. 
(2017), the technosphere tips the scales at 30 trillion tonnes of cement, steel, reservoirs, 
farmland, and resources trawled from the sea floor, all of which support a human enterprise that 































































demands 81.83(106) km2 of urban and rural space. Such calculations enable the technosphere to 
be measured alongside other geologic spheres and allows for the study of possibilities for 
affecting its behaviour as one might another physical system. In addition to the implications of 
configuring the human geography of the Earth system in this version of non-anthropocentrism, it 
is notable that the technosphere is not ‘immunized’ from other geologic spheres but rather 
integrated with them.
The reception of the technosphere has not been uniformly positive. While some apply it 
to urban studies or inter-planetary arguments (Otter, 2017; Szerszynski, 2017), others identify 
challenges. Donges et al. (2017) argue Haff’s conception of the technosphere restricts human 
agency and intention in ways counterproductive to understanding the coevolutionary dynamics 
of humans and non-humans, and that it ignores the peopled, political discourses of sustainability. 
In short, the technosphere is a physical system, but it is not only physical. Incidentally, 
responding to this objection can illuminate how the technosphere evades critiques of universal 
notions of ‘the human’ in Earth system science. To the contrary, the technosphere appraises 
human capacities for affecting the Earth system as one would other geological systems, where 
the capacities (or affordances) of complex systems have long replaced essentialist ideas of 
nature. Focus on capacities, it may be argued, provides scope for ascertaining the physical 
possibilities of sustainability without undercutting the politics or agency of how those 
possibilities are subsequently navigated. This rejoinder, however, has moral implications. As 
Carruth and Marzec (2014) argue, measurement tools and instrumental interpretations are not 
free of judgments. Other theorists are more dismissive, arguing the “unruly technosphere 
responsible for the Anthropocene” is immoral because it configures machine-driven forms of 































































industrialism with information-driven networks of capital accumulation (Pasquinelli, 2017, p. 
312). 
Provocatively, Haff’s (2017) subsequent development of the technosphere mutes several 
lines of criticism by accepting the point that the intentions of human agents are at risk in the 
technosphere. Arguing that the global population is dependent on the technosphere, Haff (2017) 
claims that, from a geological perspective, the concern is that the technosphere might seek 
efficiencies that coopt or constrain human activity, such as through algorithms designed to 
pursue efficiency but to which human well-being is incidental. Haff (2017, p. 108) worries that 
not only may humans overwhelm the forces of nature but that humans may be “…in the process 
themselves of being overwhelmed by novel forces of an evolving earth.” Advances in synthetic 
biology and nanotechnology, as Preston (2018) argues, create new moral terrain at scales that 
exceed many standard treatments of ethical action. Indeed, agreeing with critical appraisals of 
the Anthropocene, Haff (2017) grants it is irrational to treat humans as exceptional. Yet, he 
doesn’t think this is grounds for rejecting human exceptionalism; instead, Haff (2017) celebrates 
irrationality and advances it as a basis for confronting dehumanizing forces of the technosphere. 
The danger of not doing so, he argues, is that geological processes may diminish humanity’s 
“own status as essential components of an efficiency-driven technosphere” (Haff, 2017, p. 108).
Viewed through the technosphere, the moral geography of the Earth system naturalizes 
interconnections of energy, information, and materials. Recently, Lenton and Latour (2018) have 
argued the technosphere is part of a new Gaia—Gaia 2.0—that operates with some level of self-
awareness owing to how humans can set planetary goals with the weight of geologic force 































































behind them. Setting aside that this seems more a reboot of the noösphere,6 it is worth 
considering Lenton and Latour’s (2018, p. 1068) ethical conclusion, that “any attempt to tamper 
with the sensors or slow down the reaction to errors jeopardizes the chance to learn from Gaia 
how to close the loops that would enable Gaia 2.0 to better sustain the human population than the 
present world.” Here, Latour makes good on his effort to get ‘closer’ to the facts through 
empiricism, but to do so he naturalizes the technosphere. Technology does not come from 
nowhere. Its components are mined, refined, assembled, exchanged, and maintained through 
relationships, social structures, and political economies that may justifiably prompt moral 
responses of slowdown or stoppage. Such power blind techno-ethics, like Haff’s embrace of 
irrationality, do not suffice as moral reasons. As the next section considers, this is also not the 
route being developed in Earth system governance, where new forms of rationality buttress goals 
for belonging. 
3.2 Grundnorms and Goals 
The technosphere treats the human enterprise geologically, but how might that conglomerate be 
steered? This question is increasingly answered in Earth system governance in reference to 
‘governing through goals.’ Goals augment the contingencies and uncertainties of deep time with 
time-bound, metric driven agendas, such as the SDGs (see Kanie and Biermann, 2017). Goals 
also shift sustainability from norms focused on ‘setting the rules’ for markets designed to provide 
environmental relief—so-called ‘green’ neoliberalism (Bakker, 2010)—and instead direct 
economic activity towards chosen, revisable ends (Young, 2017). As Dryzek (2016) argues, 
Anthropocene institutions require reflexivity across market, non-market, and Earth system 































































feedbacks. Goals steer an already integrated economic and environmental system in two respects 
that structure this section. First, goals are increasingly referenced to the planetary boundaries of 
the Earth system and naturalized according to a grundnorm: a norm basic to all others. Second, 
goals are used to interpolate empirical claims regarding the ‘safe operating space’ provided by 
the planetary boundaries framework into normative constraints on human development (see 
Rockström et al., 2009). Together, grundnorms and goals naturalize human-Earth integration as 
empirical fact, not normative aim, and employ planetary boundaries to provide an empirical and 
rational basis for new practices of belonging. 
Kelsen’s (1945) positive legal theory held that law is a system of rules set between 
normative validity, on the one hand, and empirical facts on the other. This formulation, like 
others that operate ‘between facts and norms’ in the Kantian tradition, seek a non-metaphysical 
foundation for rational validity and political legitimacy (Habermas, 1996). Whereas Habermas 
(1996) sought this basis in empirical facts regarding communicative rationality and the reputed 
power of the better argument, scholars of environmental law turn towards empirical accounts of 
the Earth system. Here, Kelsen’s notion of a grundnorm is given empirical expression through 
facts about the function and trajectory of the Earth system as it is disclosed through Earth system 
science (e.g. Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2018). This maintains fidelity to the Kantian 
tradition but replaces Habermas’ notion of a community of truth seekers—where norms are 
derived from rational consensus achieved by overcoming social or political difference—with 
norms rationally derived from the state of the Earth system.































































Kim and Bosselmann (2013) provide one of the most robust arguments for deriving a 
grundnorm from planetary boundaries. The planetary boundaries framework, on this account, 
provides a basis for international environmental agreements because anthropogenic projects that 
do not respect planetary boundaries with respect to freshwater, climate, or any of the nine 
interacting components of the Earth system, will (ultimately) fail empirically. Well before that, 
they will reveal the irrationality of agreements that are not premised on how the Earth system 
functions. As a grundnorm, the planetary boundaries framework offers a rational and empirical 
basis of normative validity without metaphysical or culturally specific appeals to ‘nature.’ Kim 
(2016) argues such a grundnorm should also be incorporated into multilateral frameworks, such 
as those regarding the SDGs, in order to meet both social and environmental obligations. For 
Brandi (2015), there is an ethical imperative to establish an SDG for the Earth system since its 
functioning provides the basis for achieving all of the others. Hayha et al. (2016) develop a 
similar idea, arguing that in order to connect the SDGs to the Earth system it is imperative to 
incorporate ethics as a distinct sphere of decision making. In their account, moral judgments 
come in a sequence that begins with biophysical determinations of the Earth system before 
moving to assessments of socio-economic connections across scales and sectors of planetary 
dynamics. Then, in a third step, ethical principles are applied to achieve equity and justice. In 
short: with the Earth system as a grundnorm, and the facts of socio-political connections between 
people and planet in hand, moral geography finds a hierarchy not naturalized to nature, but to the 
how Earth system science discloses human-Earth integration. 
One challenge for Earth system governance and sustainability is to operationalize the 
notion of ecological integrity that underpins planetary boundaries at the scale of the Earth system 































































(Kim and Bosselmann, 2015). To this end, the novel use of “goal-setting” by the United Nations, 
such as in the SDGs, provides opportunity to incorporate empirical facts about human-Earth 
integration into political and economic agendas (Biermann et al., 2017; cf. Biermann 2014). This 
might be done by, for instance, down-scaling from the Earth system and up-scaling from human 
needs to calculate a “a good life within planetary boundaries” (O’Neill et al., 2018). When goals 
are used for governance, they contrast with the rule-based norms of neoliberalism in earlier 
iterations of sustainable development, where states were expected to set the rules for markets and 
stakeholders, and where normative legitimacy arose from fair procedures and institutions for 
economic and political allocation of resources (Young, 2017). In place of rules putatively 
designed for free competition, goals become sites where uncertainty and complexity provide 
warrant to actively steer intractably entangled political and economic processes (Kanie and 
Biermann, 2017). 
The aim of ‘governing through goals’ is not to integrate ‘many worlds’ to one Earth. 
Instead, the fact of integration means that previous norms of sustainability, such as the rules for 
reregulating markets under earlier programs of sustainable development, must be fortified by 
actively directing economies and polities to stay within the constraints of the Earth system. The 
temporal horizons of political goals, such as the 2030 SDGs, may be arbitrary from the 
perspective of the planet, but in the context of existential risks to human flourishing they entail 
ethical value assessments about possible futures (cf. Bostrom, 2013). These are judgments at the 
intersection of economics and environments that don’t naturalize moral orders to natural ones. 
Instead, they project a hierarchical order of normative integration (a grundnorm at the base of all 
others) onto a non-hierarchical Earth system that is characterized by cross-scale feedbacks and 































































non-linear dynamics (Steffen et al., 2004, 2018). As with the technosphere, this is a politics of 
naturalization that proceeds through the means of doing without nature.
4 NEOLIBERALISM WITHOUT NATURE
Why emphasize the moral geography of the Earth system, not that of the Anthropocene? In part, 
this distinction highlights that there are more than just metaethical stakes about how to think 
about the epoch as a whole. A broader concern, however, is how the loss of ‘others’ affects new 
forms of belonging (cf. Elliott, 2018). In this regard, the technosphere, a grundnorm, and goals 
perform naturalizing work that does not truck in natural laws or transcendent categories. They 
immanently render new descriptions of a physical system, new norms upon which to proceed, 
and new ways to think about the moral ends of governance; a moral geography of the Earth 
system. Examining these practices requires tools moral geography can offer, and which can 
identify a new politics of naturalization taking shape. This politics begins with human-Earth 
integration as an accomplished event, albeit not on the terms of sustainable development where 
market forces were dispatched to meet the needs of one generation without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Rather, the new politics of naturalization 
anticipates a form of neoliberalism without nature; a neoliberalism that retains the structure of 
sustainable development but sheds the assumption that nature provides a stable backdrop for 
fulfilling human needs from one generation to the next. 
The idea of the Earth system reinforces the place of ‘system’ as a—possibly the—master 
modality for knowledge in modernity (cf. Siskin, 2016). The Earth system operates, in this sense, 































































as explanandum and explanans: a way to describe phenomena to be explained and a way to order 
the knowledge explaining those phenomena. Yet it doesn’t naturalize phenomena to an external 
‘order of nature.’ Instead, it is used to moralize the means of doing without nature. To recall: the 
moral imperative is to not hinder the technological means through which Gaia 2.0 is known 
(Lenton and Latour, 2018), while a grundnorm frames empirical possibilities for the good life 
even though frames are not reasons (Hale, 2016). Likewise, using ‘goals’ to correct for the limits 
of neoliberal integration of economics and environment under sustainable development 
anticipates forms of belonging after the end of (western) nature. Neoliberal structures of 
governance, however, are left in place on such accounts when the political economy of the 
technosphere vanishes, or when a grundnorm is advanced without reparation for the uneven 
geographies now pressing planetary boundaries. Neoliberalism without nature is consistent with, 
but not yet considered in, accounts of neoliberalism (e.g. McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). 
Neoliberalism without nature has been gestured at in accounts of: the rise of neoliberal 
governmentality alongside the incorporation of resilience and complex systems theory in finance 
and valuation (Cooper, 2011; Walker and Cooper, 2011; Chiapello, 2015), the integrated, ‘causal 
architecture’ connecting environmental and economic crises (Homer-Dixon et al., 2015), and the 
“naturalization of process” that connects geologic agency to liberal modes of environmental 
governance and sustainability (Schmidt, 2017, p. 197). Here I do not seek to unpack what 
neoliberalism without nature entails, but to name a phenomenon that a renewed moral geography 
can identify in combinations of descriptive, normative, and metaethical claims now taking shape 
in accounts of human impacts on the Earth system. The use of planetary boundaries to set goals 
that direct international financial practices, such as the 2030 SDGs, provides a non-contingent 































































timeline for resource valuation and risk calculation without nature and amidst uncertainties over 
human impacts on the planet (e.g. Sachs, 2015). Perhaps most striking, however, is the moral act 
of calling for value transformation. Such calls demand an account of the moral geography of the 
Earth system that underpins them, especially given that calls for transformation are themselves 
premised on values, such as planetary stewardship, that have long been used by actors in the 
Global North to describe biological and geological resources of the Global South as of ‘world’ 
significance and to then justify political intervention and (often) capital accumulation (Macekura, 
2015; Black, 2018). Sustainability has never been value-neutral. Calls for value transformation 
structured in global programs of neoliberalism without nature also sharpen contrasts with non-
systemic, relational forms of life underpinning other socio-cultural forms of life that merit 
dignity. And they do so at a critical moment: when decisions taken will affect the trajectory of 
social and Earth system evolution for millennia.  
There is currently a missing account of how forms of belonging are being shaped as 
sustainability works without nature yet retains the form of integration achieved under 
neoliberalism. Renewing moral geography in this context provides opportunity to examine forms 
of belonging taking shape without nature or naturalized ‘others.’ It can identify naturalizing 
impulses in both transcendental and immanent accounts of belonging. A renewed moral 
geography must retain its orientation to difference and its commitment not to impose external 
categories of description, norms, or metaethical concepts on social practices. This pluralistic 
approach can and should, however, also be trained on new politics of naturalization in which 
belonging proceeds both with or (through the means of doing) without nature. This requires 
renewing commitments across geographic scholarship, such as in fields engaged with science 































































and technology studies or social studies of finance. The moral dimensions of these fields are 
frequently implied, yet often not explicitly engaged across descriptive, normative, or metaethical 
concerns. Likewise, geographic work on human-environment relations, global change research, 
and global governance might expand from recognition that the Earth system is too complex to 
govern in toto and examine how accounts of human-Earth integration developed in light of this 
fact—as a physical system, in reference to planetary boundaries, as a basis for goals—are 
shaping calls for value transformation and shifting the norms of sustainability in the 
Anthropocene. 
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Footnotes
1. Moral geography, for its part, often only indirectly engages the Anthropocene. See Olson’s 
(2018) progress reports.
2. Baker (1999), for example, engages geology through the semiotics of Charles Peirce.
3. Hornborg (2017) makes similar critiques of Haraway (2016), Tsing (2015), and Moore (2015).
4. It is unclear if adherents of OOO are also metanormative realists who hold that moral truths 
exist independently (Enoch 2010). If so, an account of those allusive truths is also required.
5. Respectively: Ginn (2014), Mitchell (2015), Lorimer and Driessen (2014).































































6. Teilhard de Chardin’s notion of the noösphere explains consciousness in bio-evolutionary 
terms to suggest self-awareness is a new step in planetary evolution (see Sideris, 2017). 
Arguably, Lenton and Latour (2018) reboot the idea with technology rather than only biology 
affecting evolutionary self-awareness.
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